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RESOLUTION BOOKLET



Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET)

The question of the European Union's approach to the Western Balkans and enlargement fatigue.



The Western Balkans remain a region of strategic importance for the European Union, yet prolonged accession processes and internal divisions within the EU have contributed to growing enlargement fatigue. This has weakened the credibility of the EU's enlargement policy and reduced incentives for reforms in candidate and potential candidate countries. At the same time, geopolitical competition in the region has intensified, raising concerns about long-term stability and alignment with the EU. Recognising enlargement as both a political and strategic tool, key questions arise regarding how the EU can reinvigorate its engagement with the Western Balkans while addressing internal constraints.

- *How can the European Union overcome enlargement fatigue and restore a credible accession perspective for the Western Balkans?*
- *Which policy approaches can strengthen stability and the EU's long-term influence in the region?*

The Model European Parliament,

- A) Further recalling the importance of economic incentives, such as but not limited to infrastructure and pre-accession assistance,
- B) Affirming the need for optimized, efficient and up-to-date accession process,
- C) Underlining the need for further and better implementation of the commitments made at the Thessaloniki summit,
- D) Deeply concerned by geopolitical competition and the growing influence of Russia and China such but not limited to cases of hybrid threats, propaganda distribution, and the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, which are disruptive to EU interests and contribute to misinformation and instability in the region,
- E) Deeply concerned about the numerous complex and often long-lasting disputes between states within the Balkan region, arising from issues regarding the sovereignty of nations, territorial disputes, multiculturalism, variety of religions, as well as other factors,
- F) Noting with concern the overly misuse of the blocking of the unanimous agreement requirement of EU member states, whenever voting on the accession of aspiring member states into the EU,
- G) Taking into consideration the sentiments of the population of both the EU and the Western Balkans regarding enlargement, backed by Eurobarometer measurements,
- H) Noting that the rule of law, fair, swift and transparent judiciary, as well as institutional readiness of candidate countries are of the utmost priority,
- I) Deeply concerned by the distorted market incentives exacerbated by the administrative burden and overlapping policies of Western Balkans states, which motivate market participants to operate in an informal economy,

- J) Deeply concerned by the fact that reform fatigue empowers stabilitocracies, allowing corrupted governments to persist unchallenged,
- 1) Welcomes the finding of the 2025 Balkan Barometer that 64 per cent of Western Balkan citizens express support for EU membership, reflecting sustained public will for European integration across the region;
 - 2) Notes that public support for EU membership in Serbia stands at 42 per cent, the lowest among candidate countries, and attributes this divergence primarily to years of stalled negotiating progress and the absence of a credible accession horizon rather than to principled opposition to European integration;
 - 3) Proposes the establishment of the LAJCAK¹ as an EU and Western Balkan programme focused on ensuring public opinion in favour of enlargement, which shall:
 - i) operate through civil society organisations, regional media, and local institutions independently of central government channels
 - ii) create transparent, visible links between concrete reform milestones and tangible benefits for EU and Western Balkan citizens
 - iii) directly address the gap between Serbia's negotiating engagement and its 42 per cent public support for EU membership;
 - 4) Stresses that Chapters 23 and 24 of the Copenhagen criteria, covering judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security respectively, must serve as anchor chapters in all accession negotiations, opened at the earliest stage and closed last, only upon verified and sustained reform implementation;
 - 5) Calls upon the European Commission to create the 4th edition of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance IPA IV² for the post-2027 era and expanding the list of areas of particular focus on,
 - i) development in physical and digital infrastructure
 - ii) critical supply-chain resilience
 - iii) decreasing the share of informal economy, while aligning allocations more explicitly with rule-of-law benchmarks and infrastructure priorities identified in national Reform Agendas, maximising the complementarity between IPA IV and the Reform and Growth Facility³
 - 6) Urges the full and ambitious implementation of the Reform and Growth Facility, ensuring that its €6 billion in grants and loans are distributed in strict accordance with verified reform milestones and that conditionality is applied uniformly across all candidate countries without exception;

¹ Local Accession and Justice Communication, Awareness and Knowledge Programme

² Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

³ The new growth plan for the Western Balkans

- 7) In collaboration with the CULT committee considers establishing KURVY⁴ sensitization campaign aimed to raise awareness amongst EU members as well as the Western Balkans regarding the continuing will of the EU to fulfil the commitments yet not upheld at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003;
- 8) Requests the revision of EU investment strategy for the Western Balkans by,
 - i) calling upon ECON to encourage the European Investment Bank to further increase its share in the Western Balkans focusing on critical strategic investments and IPA III key focus areas
 - ii) calling for the revision of Western Balkans Investment Framework to further increase efficiency regarding the distribution of funding
 - iii) creates WBAG implementing the framework of NDICI External Action Guarantee;
- 9) Urges member states and EU institutions to extend existing hybrid threat countermeasures and strategic communications frameworks to the Western Balkans, including through cooperation with national intelligence services within established legal frameworks, with particular focus on:
 - i) early detection and attribution of Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns targeting candidate country populations
 - ii) capacity-building for Western Balkan security and intelligence institutions aligned with EU and NATO standards
 - iii) creates WBAG⁵ implementing the framework of NDICI External Action Guarantee;
- 10) Calls on the Commission to utilise the reversibility mechanisms embedded in the 2020 methodology consistently, ensuring that democratic backsliding or failure to sustain reform implementation results in the measurable suspension of progress;
- 11) Reaffirms that the cluster-based accession methodology introduced in 2020 represents a more coherent and efficient framework than the preceding chapter-by-chapter approach and urges the further revision of Enlargement Methodology;
- 12) Requests that the European Commission urges MS to engage in meaningful diplomatic dialogue so as to resolve their territorial and sovereignty-related disputes with candidate countries, while recommending that they defer from using the power to object in accession votes, reserving its use only as the ultimate ratio;
- 13) Suggests that the European Commission considers the possibility of restructuring the debt of Western Balkan countries to China and Russia, with more optimised conditions for the Western Balkan countries;
- 14) Reminds of the EU-monitored framework put in place to protect minority rights under the Copenhagen criteria ⁷and supports further EU-led mediation with clear timelines to prevent delays and resolve disputes in the Balkans, by actions such as but not limited to:

⁴ Knowledge and Understanding for Reaffirming Values and Yielding Commitment

⁵ Western Balkans Action Guarantee

⁶ Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument

⁷ The essential rules established in 1993 that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union

- i) addressing the Bulgaria–North Macedonia bilateral impasse
 - ii) urging Serbia and Kosovo to fulfil their obligations under the 2023 Brussels dialogue framework and supporting EU mediation toward a legally binding normalisation agreement
 - iii) welcoming the “Friends of the Western Balkans” ministerial meeting of 12 May 2026 in Bratislava and encouraging the adoption of substantive joint recommendations for European Council enlargement discussions;
- 15) Calls for prioritizing the reduction of administrative inefficiencies that distort market incentives and encourage informal economic activity⁸, through targeted assistance and introducing one-stop procedures to support pre-accession countries in achieving full compliance with EU requirements.;
- 16) Strongly disapproves the Chinese and Russian involvement in infrastructural colonization and engaging in debt-trap schemes, by:
 - i) approving the further involvement of Western Balkans in Global Gateway programme
 - ii) promoting the involvement of EIB⁹ in the Western Balkans region;
- 17) Recommends the further involvement of the Western Balkans in decision-making within the Global Gateway¹⁰ programme with the aim of tackling Chinese control of resources, energy and infrastructure;
- 18) Instructs the president to forward the resolution to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers.

⁸ The informal economy is made up of all the economic activities, enterprises, jobs and workers that are not covered in law or in practice by formal arrangements.

⁹ European Investment Bank

¹⁰ The Global Gateway is the European Union's strategic investment initiative designed to boost sustainable, high-quality infrastructure and connections worldwide between 2021 and 2027

Committee on Development (DEVE)

The question of ensuring sustainable and ethical supply chains in the EU's green transition:



Demand for bio-based materials like biomass pellets and renewable energy sources has increased dramatically as the EU moves closer to becoming climate neutral. Concerns about deforestation, labour exploitation, land degradation, and unequal burdens placed on third countries involved in production continue to exist despite the promotion of these alternatives as sustainable solutions. The EU must balance its environmental goals with its obligation to advance global equity, ethical trade, and sustainable development.

- *Without externalizing social and environmental costs to developing nations, how can the EU ensure that green supply chains actually promote sustainability?*
- *What systems can be put in place to guarantee accountability, openness, and equitable development collaborations along the entire green supply chain?*

The Model European Parliament,

- A) Alarmed by the hurdles that companies have to face to comply with certain regulations of the Green Deal due to excessive bureaucracy and financial limits,
 - B) Deeply concerned by the lack of enforcement regarding the Farm-to-Fork-Strategy¹¹,
 - C) Aware of the weak regulatory framework resulting in poor transparency regarding supply chains and impact on sustainable development,
 - D) Aware of the negative effects of deforestation and the lack of precision in its regulations,
 - E) Recognizing the insufficient enforcement of EU regulations due to poor cooperation between national authorities and European institutions,
 - F) Aware of the negative impact on both internal economic development and global competitiveness caused by expensive sustainability standards,
 - G) Fully alarmed by the lack of awareness among the public and policymakers about sustainable development regulations in developing countries,
 - H) Bearing in mind the problem of greenwashing that results in a lack of trust from consumers due to weak labelling regulations and a lack of education,
 - I) Deeply concerned by the weakness of labour regulations regarding developing countries exporting products to the EU,
- 1) Recommends:
- i) revising the Green Deal's policies in cooperation with companies and developing countries that are economically limited to comply with its requirements
 - ii) the ECON Committee to propose tax adjustments to provide compensation for the companies affected by the Green Deal;

¹¹ Farm-to-Fork – core strategy of the European Green Deal designed to transition to a sustainable food system

- 2) Recommends implementing sunset provisions¹² and better regulation agenda for laws connected to the Green Deal;
- 3) Calls for the creation of an organisation that will provide:
 - i) financial support and assistance to companies facing difficulties to complying with environmentally sustainable practices
 - ii) clearly structured information about the EU sustainable development policy to the companies;
- 4) Urges the European Commission and Member States to strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the Farm-to-Fork Strategy with the Bottom-Up principle¹³ through:
 - i) regular audits
 - ii) transparent reporting systems
 - iii) penalties for the non-complying Member States;
- 5) Calls upon the EU to recommend and develop a framework for tax incentives and transitional support for enterprises adapting to environmentally sustainable practices to the Member States;
- 6) Urges the Member States to follow the CSDDD¹⁴ and implement enhanced digital monitoring and reporting mechanisms on the EU level to assess the social and environmental impacts of supply chains;
- 7) Calls for a revision of the PPP¹⁵ in cooperation with the JURI and ECON Committees and encourages the Member States to implement it;
- 8) Affirms the enhancement of existing deforestation regulations such as but not limited to the EUDR¹⁶ by introducing precise definitions and criteria to ensure effective implementation;
- 9) Encourages enhanced cooperation between national authorities and European institutions through the creation of joint enforcement bodies and improved data-sharing systems that will allow the for the publication of regularly filed reports;
- 10) Calls upon the improvement of the CBAM¹⁷ in cooperation with the European Commission;
- 11) Proclaims the establishment of the organisation GYATT¹⁸ which will:
 - i) provide education for policymakers about steps towards sustainable development in third countries through workshops
 - ii) create a multi-platform media campaign regarding the topic of sustainable development
 - iii) implement sustainability education in schools, raising awareness about ecolabel systems such as but not limited to the EU Ecolabel;
- 12) Encourages stricter regulations and the standardization of sustainability labels for companies with products on the EU's market;

¹² Sunset Provision - measure within a law, regulation or contract that specifies an automatic expiration date

¹³ Bottoms up principle - problem-solving, management approach that builds from the smallest and simplest parts and builds up to a complete system

¹⁴ CSDDD - Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive

¹⁵ PPP - Polluters Pay Principle - make the party responsible for the damage of the environment that it has caused

¹⁶ Regulation on deforestation-free products

¹⁷ CBAM - Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

¹⁸ Global Yield for Applied Transformation & Technology

- 13) Requests supporting diplomacy and cooperation between the EU and developing countries by such as but not limited to:
- i) encouraging the TEIs¹⁹ to schedule regular meetings for European and developing countries' policymakers to facilitate sharing their experiences and expertise
 - ii) making joint agreements and regulations from which both the EU and developing countries benefit;
- 14) Calls upon representatives of the Member States to:
- i) encourage developing countries to strengthen labour regulations throughout multilateral and bilateral diplomacy
 - ii) strengthen labour regulations regarding developing countries exporting products to the EU in cooperation with the JURI Committee;
- 15) Encourages the development and implementation of a transparent digital traceability system which is:
- i) easily accessible to the public
 - ii) designed to monitor the origin and sustainability of raw materials
 - iii) meant to support the IKIGAI project²⁰ in increasing digitised logistics regarding bureaucratic hurdles and the lack of sustainability and emission data;
- 16) Instructs the President to forward the resolution to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers.

¹⁹ TEIs - Team Europe Initiatives

²⁰ IKIGAI - EU funded initiative aimed at decarbonizing freight transport and logistics

Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)

As labour markets across the European Union become increasingly fragmented, a growing number of workers are engaged in non-standard forms of employment, including temporary contracts, freelance work, and other atypical arrangements. Many of these workers face limited access to social security, unemployment benefits, and adequate labour protections due to contribution-based systems designed around traditional, full-time employment. This gap in social protection risks increasing precariousness, in-work poverty, and social exclusion, while undermining the principles of fairness and solidarity underpinning the European Social Model.



- *How can the EU support Member States in modernising social protection systems to ensure adequate coverage for non-standard and atypical workers?*
- *What measures are necessary to improve the portability, accessibility, and sustainability of social rights across diverse forms of employment?*

The Model European Parliament,

- A) Concerned by the result of misclassification of workers by temporary work agencies, such as the lack of certainty over the amount of working hours and little autonomy over prices,
 - B) Concerned by how the misclassification of workers in the EU allows the clients of these workers to avoid paying for employee social contributions,
 - C) Aware of an increasing significance of non-standard form of employment in the labour market,
 - D) Aware that the current legislation doesn't fit the rapidly increasing demand for non-standard employment in the labour market,
 - E) Noting with deep concern the lack of awareness among atypical workers regarding their legal rights,
 - F) Concerned that differences in social security systems can create difficulties for atypical workers to fully understand their social rights when moving between EU Member States,
 - G) Concerned by the lack of access atypical employees have to social security systems,
 - H) Alarmed by the disproportionate impact that lower social security benefits for atypical employees have on women,
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- 1) Recommends expanding the already existing rebuttal presumption²¹ in the EU Platform Work Directive to include a wider range of atypical²² employment;
 - 2) Recommends the JURI²³ committee to expand the already existing rebuttal presumption in the EU Platform Work Directive to lower the control threshold for this presumption;
 - 3) Requests platforms to guarantee minimum weekly working hours for atypical workers, thus the minimum standards will be defined by a pool of experts;

²¹A presumption that makes a person an employee if the platform controls the key aspects of their work

²² Work arrangements that deviate from the standard model of full time, single employer or permanent employment

²³ Committee on Legal Affairs

- 4) Calls on to strengthen the identification and prevention process of the misclassification of workers²⁴ and temporary employees, particularly in a platform-based²⁵ and non-standard²⁶ employment²⁷, to ensure that workers receive appropriate labour rights and social security;
- 5) Calls for a transparent national criterion to distinguish between self-employed and employed workers, alongside a stronger enforcement of an existing legislation to prevent the avoidance of social contributions;
- 6) Calls upon a shift of the burden of proof regarding the independence of employees towards the employers in case of criminal trials;
- 7) Authorizes:
 - i) an extension of the existing employee-like²⁸ status to cover also other types of dependent contractors²⁹
 - ii) the creation of a baseline amount of benefits that these contractors receive from their main employer/client;
- 8) Recognizes the importance of flexible work in the modern labour market;
- 9) Supports maintaining flexible work's legal status across the EU by not infringing on atypical work as a whole;
- 10) Calls for a better implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights to ensure the access to social security for all workers;
- 11) Further requests Eurostat to submit their annual data to map labour trends and pinpoint specific groups in the labour market;
- 12) Calls for the creation of FAHH³⁰ which would conduct yearly reviews on national labour laws and on atypical job markets in every Member State to research coverage gaps for atypical workers - and to present their findings to the ELA³¹ - who in turn can modify the legislation to better fit the needs of atypical employees;
- 13) Supports the development of accessible digital government platforms providing clear information regarding the employee's social security rights - and how they change when crossing borders - while introducing certified training modules that workers must complete upon registration;
- 14) Draws the attention to legal information and coverage already provided to workers by the trade unions and the existing EU organizations;
- 15) Approves a promotional campaign and digital governmental portal that informs atypical workers about their rights in every Member State;
- 16) Encourages a better coordination between Member States to improve the portability of social rights when crossing borders;

²⁴ Workers who are officially labelled as "self-employed" who, in substance, are full time employees

²⁵ Labour form where digital platforms connect individuals to clients for paid tasks, e.g. transportation, delivery or remote digital services

²⁶ Synonym for "atypical"

²⁷ Work arrangements that deviate from the standard model of full time, single employer, permanent employment

²⁸ "Employee-like" is a status that platform workers fall under if they rely on one platform for over 70% of their income

²⁹ Workers that depend on one client/employer for the majority of their income

³⁰ Fieldwork Analytics Hub on atypical Human resources

³¹ European Labor Authority

- 17) Expresses its appreciation for the implementation of the ESSPASS³²;
- 18) Supports the development of interoperable systems that provide personalized guidance and fast advice for employees transitioning across the Member States;
- 19) Encourages Member States to adapt flexible contribution schemes for irregular incomes;
- 20) Encourages an inclusion of the national transition into the ESSPASS to display the employee's contribution data more easily, thus avoiding bureaucratic procedures;
- 21) Supports the ETUC³³ to help combat the problems found in the 'vague sectors'³⁴ of atypical work which needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis;
- 22) Supports a shift from the threshold-based to the time-accumulation-based social security benefit system;
- 23) Calls on Member States to acknowledge inequalities in social security affecting women in an atypical work;
- 24) Urges Member States to ensure the access to maternity and paternity leave for all workers, regardless of their employment status;
- 25) Instructs the president to forward the resolution to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers.

³² European Social Security Pass

³³ European Trade Union Confederation

³⁴ Kinds of atypical workplaces where the conditions significantly vary from one another and cannot be acted upon universally

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)

The question of balancing regulatory safeguards on artificial intelligence with the effective use of AI by law enforcement in the EU:



As criminal networks increasingly rely on digital technologies, law enforcement authorities across the European Union are calling for expanded use of artificial intelligence to enhance crime prevention, investigation, and cross-border cooperation. However, existing and proposed EU regulatory frameworks, including safeguards under the AI Act, have raised concerns among police authorities that excessive administrative and legal constraints may limit the effective use of such technologies. At the same time, civil liberties organisations and lawmakers warn that reducing safeguards risks enabling mass surveillance, discrimination, and violations of fundamental rights.

- *How can the European Union strike a balance between empowering law enforcement to use AI effectively and ensuring robust protection of fundamental rights and democratic oversight?*
- *Should existing regulatory constraints on AI in policing be adapted, maintained, or strengthened in light of evolving security challenges?*

The Model European Parliament,

- A) Fully aware by the lack of research on the significant threats of organised crime, as well as the lack of innovation that leads to a termination of technological evolution,
- B) Aware of the procedural complications and of the redundancy caused by the AI-system-validation processes between Member states,
- C) Deeply concerned that biased or poisoned data may distort predictive policing systems leading to discriminatory outcomes,
- D) Aware of the risks of biometric identification, including privacy issues, weak data protection, and lack of control over data deletion and retention,
- E) Alarmed by the fact that manipulation of vulnerable groups, such as minorities, elderly and/or underaged individuals, flourishes with the increasing utilisation of AI tools,
- F) Having devoted attention to the lack of investments regarding the usage of AI in training officers, law enforcement, infrastructure, and other spheres of efficient law enforcement,
- G) Having regard to the lack of detail and incompleteness of Article III of the EU AI Act,
- H) Concerned by insufficient cross-border cooperations in the use of AI, leading to inconsistencies and reduced effectiveness in addressing serious and organised crime,
- I) Alarmed by the lack of legal clarity on the consequences of police officers who conduct investigations on law enforcement based on AI systems,
- J) Bearing in mind that insufficient penalties for AI-related non-compliance undermine accountability and enforcement,
- K) Emphasizing the lack of scrutiny regarding the monitoring and surveillance of Member states' implementation and enforcement of the EU AI Act,
- L) Recognizing the threat that police investigations, dependent on AI-system findings, pose a threat to the validity of legal processes, following potential confabulation,

- 1) Calls for increasing investments for research efficiency and data collection to improve the understanding of law enforcement about how organised crime utilises AI technologies for the development of an AI system within the EU AI Act;
- 2) Calls upon the enlargement of the comprehensive and continuous investigation and research on the key threats and impacts of SOC³⁵, such as but not limited to:
 - i) the use of AI in SOC
 - ii) the actions taken by Europol accordingly, such as but not limited to commit to:
 - i. a more frequent publication of the IOCTA³⁶ and SOCTA³⁷
 - ii. an improvement of the procedure of the Europol excellence awards;
- 3) Urges Member states, in cooperation with the ENISA³⁸ and the EU AI Office, to simplify and harmonize AI-system-validation procedures across the EU through the establishment of a unified, independent validation framework;
- 4) Urges the further enhancement of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including regular reporting obligations, independent audits, and performance assessments, to ensure consistent implementation and enforcement of the EU AI Act across Member states;
- 5) Calls for the investment in the expansion and enforcement of mandatory regular and independent audits of datasets used in AI systems, and in the implementation of strict data quality and monitoring mechanisms to ensure diversity;
- 6) Urges the European Commission, through the EU AI Office, to apply stronger compliance oversight and enforcement of Article V (1), first subparagraph, point (h) of the EU AI Act, and of Article V (2)–(8) of the EU AI Act;
- 7) Affirms the need for an expansion of AI detection systems, open to the public and capable of analysing possible AI-generated content, alongside the addition of an obligatory, unremovable and inseparable watermark on all AI outputs to facilitate recognizability;
- 8) Calls for the further investment into the detection of AI systems, such as but not limited to those referred to the IOCTA, used by criminal networks targeting vulnerable groups, subsequently instructing Europol to:
 - i) to take action accordingly
 - ii) to reinforce EU citizens' protection from these AI systems;
- 9) Requests the integration and expansion of public awareness campaigns and digital literacy programmes into existing EU initiatives, aimed at informing citizens about risks, such as biased AI decisions or misleading content, and the sensibilization of AI's risks, such as but not limited to deepfakes and impersonation attempts;
- 10) Calls upon the European Commission to expand law enforcement AI training, according to the following framework:

³⁵ Serious and Organised Crime

³⁶ Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment

³⁷ Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment

³⁸ European Union Agency for Cybersecurity

- i) all Member states are granted the opportunity to apply for the fund and deploy it to further train local experts on AI systems
 - ii) all trained officials must receive a certification proving their qualification to operate high-risk AI systems during legal investigations;
- 11) Supports the establishment of an AI-technology-support programme for under-resourced Member states containing:
 - i) technical assistance in the application of AI systems into legal investigations
 - ii) training of officers operating high-risk AI systems in accordance with the CEPOL³⁹;
- 12) Calls upon the European Commission to:
 - i) review the EU AI Act
 - ii) analyse its various implementations across Member states
 - iii) give a concrete definition of terminology mentioned in it;
- 13) Encourages strengthened international cooperation in the use of AI in law enforcement, including further collaboration with Europol and enhanced data-sharing protocols and joint AI task forces;
- 14) Calls upon the European Commission to propose a clear and binding definition of the accountability and responsibility of EU law enforcement entities, including but not limited to natural persons, where and in so far, the used AI systems are used exclusively for law enforcement purposes;
- 15) Further reminds Member states of the need for human oversight of high-risk AI systems and unacceptable-risk AI systems;
- 16) Condemns the allowance of a final decision by any and all AI systems, leading to the violation of fundamental human rights;
- 17) Calls upon the European Commission to:
 - i) review the penalties mentioned in Chapter XII of the EU AI Act and the possibilities of non-financial penalties
 - ii) introduce, implement, and enforce additional financial and non-financial fines regarding non-compliance of the EU AI Act;
- 18) Urges the European Commission to conduct compliance reviews which are to follow each and every implementation date of the EU AI Act exclusively, according to the EU AI Act Implementation 'Timeline of Member states' implementation and enforcement of the EU AI Act;
- 19) Further encourages the improvement of clear legal standards governing the admissibility of AI-generated discovered and analysed evidence during prosecution, including legal guidelines ensuring the utilized AI system's:
 - i) reliability
 - ii) traceability
 - iii) clarity of decision making;

³⁹ European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training

- 20) Instructs the President to forward the resolution to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers.

Committee on Culture and Education (CULT)

The question of safeguarding Europe's cultural heritage in an era of conflict, climate change, and digitalisation:



Europe's cultural heritage, recognised through frameworks such as UNESCO World Heritage status, is increasingly threatened by armed conflict, climate-induced disasters, mass tourism, and illicit trafficking. Simultaneously, digitalisation presents new opportunities for preservation, but also raises concerns regarding authenticity, access, and cultural ownership. Protecting cultural heritage is not only about preservation, but also about identity, education, and intergenerational responsibility.

- *How can the EU ensure inclusivity and accessibility while bolstering the protection of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage?*
- *What part should international collaboration and digital technologies play in preserving Europe's common cultural heritage?*

The Model European Parliament,

- A) Recognising the growing pressure of mass tourism on historical sites, leading to unwanted harm and loss of cultural authenticity,
- B) Noting with deep concern the rise in illicit trafficking of cultural artefacts and the challenges in enforcing international cultural property laws,
- C) Taking into consideration the need to strengthen the safeguarding mechanisms for intangible heritage, such as, but not limited to, languages, traditions, and performing arts,
- D) Contemplating the starkly exposed heritage monuments and artefacts in peril from the Russo-Ukrainian war,
- E) Concerned by the absence of interest regarding each country's traditions due to the low level of awareness among the youth,
- F) Noting with concern the need to further strengthen cultural heritage's resilience to climate change and the preparedness for extreme weather events,
- G) Aware that existing EU cultural instruments operate in a non-coordinated system,
- H) Fully believing that historical monuments in the EU should be accessible,
- I) Deeply concerned by the irreversible destruction of cultural heritage during armed conflicts and movable cultural objects being lost before documentation can be completed, which leads to future generations being deprived of their shared history and identity,
- J) Alarmed by both the ethical and security risks of rapid AI development and the potential it offers in the question of creating a European Digital Cultural Heritage Space,
- K) Acknowledging the cross-border nature of several European heritage sites, which requires international coordination that individual member states cannot achieve alone

- 1) Calls upon the Commission to develop a voluntary Sustainable Heritage Tourism Framework, providing Member States with:
 - i) standardised methodologies for measuring visitor pressure and unwanted harm at registered sites
 - ii) recommended capacity thresholds developed in consultation with local communities
 - iii) access to Structural Funds for communities where preservation costs and tourism revenue are in direct conflict;
- 2) Encourages Member States to design and implement coordinated public media campaigns aimed at promoting lesser-known cultural heritage sites to diversify tourist flows and reduce pressure on over-visited landmarks, within the Creative Europe programme;
- 3) Urges Member States to strengthen border controls and enhance cooperation between national authorities and international agencies, such as, but not limited to, Europol, to combat the illicit trafficking of cultural artefacts;
- 4) Suggests creating a framework under the European Commission, following the EU AI Act's logic and strict transparency policies, regarding the use of an AI-powered image recognition software to scan online auction sites and social media marketplaces for illicitly traded cultural goods;
- 5) Supports funding programs for the preservation of intangible cultural heritage, such as but not limited to languages, crafts, and traditions at risk of disappearance;
- 6) Calls for the creation of EAHCMA⁴⁰ - a body that will be tasked with documenting, securing, and, where possible, evacuating endangered artifacts and monuments in conflict zones within or close to EU borders, and the possibility of recreating heritage when it is destroyed;
- 7) Encourages Member States to increase youth awareness of national traditions by:
 - i) integrating cultural education into school curricula while using innovative digital learning tools
 - ii) supporting workshop and cultural events;
- 8) Urges the establishment of an EU Heritage Climate Risk Coordination Body linked to the Copernicus Land Monitoring Service, tasked with:
 - i) aggregating national heritage vulnerability data into a shared dashboard accessible to all member state heritage authorities
 - ii) issuing early warnings and predicting possible risks for sites facing acute climate risk, prioritising those where irreversible deterioration is already documented;
- 9) Supports interactive social media platforms that share cultural narratives or projects that focus their attention on bringing the cultural heritage closer to the youth;
- 10) Encourages the European Commission and Member States to establish targeted micro-grant schemes, within existing programmes such as Creative Europe, aimed at supporting new cultural

⁴⁰ EAHCMA (European Agency of Conservation of Heritage Monuments and Artefacts)

practitioners, in the preservation and transmission of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage;

- 11) Recommends greater cooperation between Member States by:
 - i) unifying legal requirements and standards
 - ii) sharing data via the CEDSCH⁴¹
 - iii) further funding for the cultural instruments;
- 12) Invites the Commission to conduct an audit of existing EU heritage-related funding streams to identify overlaps, gaps, and inefficiencies, with findings published transparently and used to inform the next financial programming cycles;
- 13) Emphasises the importance of promoting accessible formats such as, but not limited to:
 - i) audio descriptions
 - ii) subtitles
 - iii) sign language versions;
- 14) Calls for the further creation and development of open-access digital platforms hosting cultural content, managed by the Member States;
- 15) Recommends that the Commission develop a rapid heritage impact assessment methodology, deployable immediately following ceasefire agreements, to document losses and prioritize reconstruction efforts in cooperation with UNESCO and the Council of Europe;
- 16) Calls upon the Commission to develop a framework for the use of AI in culture-related cases, such as, but not limited to:
 - i) cultural heritage preservation
 - ii) addressing questions of intellectual property
 - iii) community consent
 - iv) algorithmic bias in the representation of cultural content
 - v) implementation of a blockchain system, assigning digital fingerprints to every original physical work, labelling all ingenious replicas as such;
- 17) Encourages the Commission to create a dedicated cross-border heritage grant stream under Creative Europe with simplified application procedures, to ensure smaller member states are not disadvantaged by administrative constraints;
- 18) Calls for the establishment of a standardised EU-wide digital inventory protocol for the systematic and pre-emptive documentation of cultural assets, utilising high-resolution digital technologies and AI to ensure things such as, but not limited to rapid archiving and protection against illicit trafficking or irreversible destruction, while simultaneously integrating cultural heritage protection into military planning, to map sensitive sites and prevent their targeting during armed conflicts;
- 19) Encourages the Commission to introduce joint funding calls between programmes, specifically targeting heritage protection projects and reducing the need to apply to multiple calls separately, such as but not limited to:

⁴¹ CEDSCH (Common European Data Space for Cultural Heritage)

- i) Creative Europe
 - ii) Horizon Europe
 - iii) the Digital Europe Programme;
- 20) Instructs the president to forward the resolution to the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers.

Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)

The question of ensuring more equal digital public administration standards across the EU:



As the European Union advances its digital transformation, significant disparities remain in the level of digitalisation of public administration among Member States. While some have developed fully digital systems, others continue to rely on paper-based or fragmented procedures. These differences create administrative inefficiencies, unequal access to public services, and obstacles to the consistent implementation of EU law, ultimately affecting citizens' ability to exercise their rights across the Union. Ensuring common standards for digital public administration is essential for legal certainty, transparency, and the effective functioning of the internal market, while also raising concerns regarding data protection, accessibility, and respect for national competences.

- *How can the European Union support the alignment of digital public administration across Member States while respecting national legal traditions and competences?*
- *What steps can be taken to ensure that digitalisation improves legal certainty, access to public services, and democratic accountability, rather than increasing administrative inequality?*

The Model European Parliament,

- A) Fully aware of the differences in bureaucracy and digital infrastructure among the Member States, leading to issues such as, but not limited to imbalances in the efficiency and speed of digitalisation development,
- L) Recognizing that data transfer and mobility, taking the status quo into consideration, poses significant complications on logistical procedures for cross-border users,
- M) Affirming that member states apply varied rules for verifying national and foreign documents (e.g. digital documents), which results in the need for excessive human and financial resources nostrification of the document,
- N) Deeply concerned about certain groups of people not having access to learn basic digital skills, such as, but not limited to citizens from low-income households, elderly people, citizens with lower education,
- O) Fully alarmed by the differences between digital education levels across the Member States,
- P) Recognizing the shortage of ICT-specialists and providers of digital education, delaying the progress of digitalization in Member States,
- Q) Fully alarmed by the threat of corruption in public procurement procedures in the Member States,
- R) Emphasizing the need for control checks of the digitalisations progress in the Member States,
- S) Deeply concerned that ICT solutions most used in the EU (e.g. Microsoft, Google products) are closed-sourced softwares, which pose a threat to the security of the users' private data,

- 1) Requests further investment into digitalization of public services for the countries placed below the European Average through the means of a formal request to the European Commission including all the necessary details;
- 2) Recommends the creation of 'European Digitalisation Forum', an in-person summit, where above-the-European-average countries educate the below-the-European-average countries and together form a plan to close the gap in the difference between the average and the EU country's score;
- 3) Encourages the EU to expand the usage of already existing programs such as eIDAS regulation⁴², EUDI⁴³, IEA⁴⁴ by further introducing them to companies and citizens;
- 4) Calls for the establishment of a federated EU administrative data network in which Member States maintain sovereign databases containing personal data, accessible in other Member States in accordance with GDPR⁴⁵ and data-sharing guidelines;
- 5) Proposes that Member States gradually reduce the need for in-person notarial acts where the reliability and legal validity of the document can be ensured by that means of qualified electronic signatures, recognized e-ID systems, and the European Digital Identity Wallet, in line with the eIDAS and EUDI frameworks;
- 6) Encourages the training of public administration workers in using digital verification tools and cross-border systems;
- 7) Calls upon the Member States to offer basic digital skill workshops in schools to ensure that students from low-income households have access to develop digital skills;
- 8) Recommends establishing a system of collection and redistribution of used but functioning hardware devices;
- 9) Calls on the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) to promote the integration of fundamental digital competences into national curricula across all the Member States that follows a model of curriculum;
- 10) Recommends the expansion of the Erasmus+ scholarship budget especially for ICT⁴⁶ -related fields, to increase the number of digital-qualified professionals;
- 11) Endorses free EU-certified training programs for teachers to raise the level of the education and school system;
- 12) Encourages cross-border partnerships between schools demonstrating both high-performance and development of digital education practices, with the aim of closing the digital education gap between the Member States;

⁴² eIDAS regulation: electronic identification.

⁴³ EUDI: European Unified ID.

⁴⁴ IEA: Interoperable Europe Act

⁴⁵ GDPR: General Data Protection Regulation

⁴⁶ ICT: Information and Communication Technology

- 13) Recommends the establishment of a graduate support scheme for young ICT talents, conditional upon their willingness to work at an EU-based company or institution within the first 10 years after obtaining their degree;
- 14) Recommends the establishment of an EU Blue Card fast-track scheme for highly qualified ICT professionals from third countries, additionally offering competitive scholarships and relocation support packages;
- 15) Calls on removing disproportionate administrative and licensing requirements imposed on small ICT start-ups, with fewer than 50 employees, during their early-stage operation;
- 16) Calls upon the establishment of a standardized framework for public procurement procedures ensuring transparency and accessibility to the public for the Member States to follow voluntarily within their national systems:
 - a. the system will be monitored by a specialized body responsible for analysis
- 17) Designates a group of experts responsible for carrying out periodic and scheduled checks on the progress of digitalisation in the Member States;
- 18) Authorizes the establishment of measurable milestones for the Member States to follow in the process of digitalization, providing additional funding through existing mechanisms for those demonstrating sufficient progress;
- 19) Requests that the ICT solutions used in the public sector become EU-based open-source softwares;
- 20) Calls for the establishment of targeted EU funding programs to support the development of competitive European digital infrastructure, such as but not limited to cloud computing, artificial intelligence and software ecosystems;
- 21) Encourages the creation of a European “Digital Data Passport” that enables users to transparently track where their personal data is being stored and whom the data is accessible to;
- 22) Instructs the president to forward the resolution to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers.